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STUDENT NOTES

characterized the action of the attorney in Schzrmer v. Nethercutt as
falling in the latter class.
The law, in fixing liability on attorneys, must recognize that human
judgment is fallible. Courts, as well as lawyers, disagree concerning
the many matters about which each may have a fairly fixed opinion.
The law is truly a science, but an imperfect one, because it depends
for exemplification and application upon the imperfect judgments and
consciences of men. Therefore when a attorney has used ordinary care
in acquainting himself with the law his misjudgment as to the application thereof should not render him liable. But where he has carelessly
failed to acquaint himself with those elementary legal principles that
are well established and clearly defined in the elementary books, or
which have been declared in adjudged cases that have been duly reported and published a sufficient length of time to have become known
to those who exercise reasonable diligence in keeping pace with the
literature of the profession, then the law must say that he is liable to
those for whom he has engaged to exercise his knowledge and skill in
a professional capacity.
It is extremely difficult, if not utterly impossible, to .lay down any
general rule which should control the measure of liability in all cases.
Each case must be decided in the light of its own peculiar circumstances. The rule in England seems to have been that an attorney is
liable to his client only in cases of gross neglect or gross incompetence.
From an examination of the malpractice cases in this country, a juster
rule seems to exist, that the attorney is liable for the want of such skill,
care and diligence as men of the legal profession commonly possess
and exercise in matters of professional employment. The general rules
governing the execution of testamentary instruments have been fairly
well established by a line of cases running back past the passage of
the Statute of Wills in 1540. There seems to be no reasonable excuse
for exempting from liability an attorney who has failed to follow those
fundamental rules, with which it seems imperative that every lawyer
should, to a certain extent, become familiar.
The legal profession cannot reasonably find fault with the rules
which are generally accepted concerning liability for malpractice. These
rules are necessary, as well for the protection of the legal profession
as for the client for whom the attorney seeks to act.
WALrTER D. VEST.
JUnISDIc T -Srrus OF THE CnnrE.-A recent newspaper clipping
contained an account of the murder of A in Kentucky by B who was
standing in West Virginia when he fired the fatal shot.
The man was apprehended in West Virginia and brought up for
trial in the Wes Virginia court on the charge of murder. The judge
released the prisoner because the courts in West Virginia did not
have jurisdiction to try the prisoner for the murder committed in
another state.
The murderer will go unpunished unless he is brought to trial In
a court of Kentucky where the murder occurred. Kentucky cannot
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ask for a rendition of the prisoner. The prisoner is in no legal sense
a fugitive from justice for he is not guilty of any crime in Wes Virginia and cannot be a fugitive from Kentucky courts until he has
once been in Kentucky after the commission of the crime. State v.
Hall, 115 N. C. 811, 44 Am. St. Rep. 501 (1894), In re Mohr, 73 Ala.
503 (1884).
Was the court's ruling correct? This paper will try to show that
the court could not have done other than it did.
Public sentiment and the layman's sense of common justice aemand that the murderer should be punished and that wherever he
might be apprehended should be returned. But the rules of law must
be complied with. The court does not make the law but only applies
the law as laid down in the books.
It is a general principle of law that one state or sovereignty cannot enforce the penal or criminal laws of another, or punish crimes
or offenses committed in and against another state or sovereignty.
Story Conflicts of Law 620-623. But among the exceptions to this rule
are the cases where one being at the time in one state does a criminal act which takes effect in another state as, inter alia, where one,
from a standpoint beyond the line of a state, fires a gun or set in
motion any force which inflicts an injury within the state, he is
punishable, though absent, the same as if he were present. 1 Bishop,
Criminal Law 109.
Murder is intentionally striking a fatal blow and the consequent
death. The question of intent will not be discussed in this paper; only
the stroke and the consequent death will be considered. At common
law the concurrence of both were necessary to consummation of the
crime, and it was incomplete in either if the blow was struck and
subsequent death took place in different parts. 8 Rob. (La.) 545, 41
Am. Dec. 301. The rule was evaded by bringing the body of the deceased back to the place where the blow was struck. The jury could
then inquire both of the stroke and death. Later according to Lord
Hale (P C. 426), an indictment was allowed "where the stroke was
given"
The question then is, where was the blow struck, in West Virginia
or Kentucky' If struck in West Virginia then the court held wrongly
but if struck in Kentucky the court did not have jurisdiction and
rightly released the prisoner.
The principle of the common law quz facit per a~ium facit per se
is of universal application both in criminal and civil cases, and he
who does an act by his agent is considered as if he had done it in his
own proper person. Barkhamsted v. Parsons (1819), 8 Conn. 1. Therefore, where one puts in force an agency for the commission of crime,
he, in legal contemplation, accompanies the same to the point where
it becomes 'effectual. Siimpson v. State, 92 Ga. 41 (1893). This was
a case where a man standing in South Carolina fired a shot at an-'
other in a boat on the river near the Georgia side. The bullet missed
the man in the boat but the Georgia court held that the crime of
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"shooting at another" was committed in the state of Georgia. The
bullet did not take effect but "the law regards him as accompanying
the ball, and he is represented by it up to the point where it strikes."
In the case of State v. Carter, 27 N. J. L. 409 (1859), a man in
New York fired across the border into New Jersey. The court said
"the question whether the sword, the ball or any other missile passes
over the boundary in the act of striking, being a matter of no consequence, the act is where it strikes, as much where the party who
strikes stands out of the state, as 'where he stands in it" And in the
same case the court held that where the indictment charged the defendant with striking the mortal blow in New York, that no act was
done in that state by the defendant in as much as he sent no missile
or letter or message that operated as an act within the state. The
leading case on this point is State v. Hall d Dockey (1894), 114 N. C.
909. The deceased was wounded and died in the state of Tennessee
and the fatal wounds were inflicted by the defendants by shooting at
the deceased wVhile they were standing in North Carolina. The court
held that North Carolina did not have jurisdiction for the offense of
murder at common law was committed within the jurisdiction of
Tennessee.
Our own Kentucky courts have held the same doctrine to be true.
In Hatfiel v. Commonwealth (1869), 11 Ky. Ls Rep. 468, 12 S. W 309,
the defendants were indicted, tried and convicted for murder on or near
the Virginia line. One defendant remained on the Virginia side with
a rifle ready to give aid while the others went over the line into Kentucky and committed the murder. It was contended that the defendant on the Virginia side being two hundred or three hundred yards
distant in another state could not in contemplation of law have aided
or abetted the murder in Kentucky, and, therefore, was not a principal. However, the Kentucky courts held that he was rightly
convicted, stating that while it was not pretended that -the courts
of one state could enforce its laws beyond the state boundary,
yet that "where one puts in operation the force or power that causes
injury he is responsible where the wrong is perpetrated, although he
may not be actually present" The court quotes from the case of King
v. Coombes (1785), 1 East 367, a case where a man was shot one hundred yards out at sea by another standing on the shore held that the
admiralty court only had jurisdiction, "the offense being committed
where the death happens and not at the place from whence the cause
of death proceeded"
Another interesting case in Kentucky was where a girl was given
cocaine in Ohio and after the defendants thought her dead brought the
body to Kentucky and cut her head off. The evidence proved she was
not dead at the time she was brought into Kentucky and the court
took jurisdiction because the mortal blow of severing the head from
the body was delivered in Kentucky. Jackson v. Commonwealth, 100
Ky. 239, 38 S. W 1091 (1896). However, in a later case, Commonwealth v. Arkns, 148 Ky. 207, 146 S. W. 431, 39. L. R. A. (N. S.) 822
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(1912), the deceased was poisoned in Ohio and brought to Kentucky
where she died of the poison. The court held it had no jurisdiction
because the mortal blow was not struck, or rather the poison was not
administered in Kentucky and that Ohio had jurisdiction.
Some states have passed statutes dealing with this particular
problem and in all cases they have been uniformly held to be constitutional. A fair example is that of Texas, by Section 1700, Article
211 of Wilson's Texas Criminal Statutes, it is provided "if a person
being at the time within this state shall inflict upon another out of
this state an injury by reason of which the injured person dies without the limits of the state, he may be prosecuted in the county where
he was when the injury was inflicted"
The people of Kentucky or the people of West Virginia cannot
blame the court for ruling as it was bound to do. The people can only
blame themselves for not seeing that the men they have selected to
represent them pass a statute remedying such a deplorable situation.
In the interest of society, laTv and order, every one should take it
upon himself to be a committee of one to see that the next legislature
passes a statute such as the one set out above.
FN.CIS H. HAN-KES.

